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This paper provides a commentary on the evolution and 
position of petty offence law in the Polish legal system. 
For the sake of order, it should be noted that the nature 
of petty offences is ambiguous and not one-dimensional. 
Their status and role depend on the assumptions of the 
legislator, who may emphasise their various aspects. A pet-
ty offence may be an element of criminal law in the broad 
sense, as a “small crime” or an administrative tort. More-
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over, the development of Polish petty offence law and the 
arguments supporting the choice of specific legal solutions 
are presented. The probable future of Polish petty offence 
law was also indicated, aiming at the conclusion that the 
most serious petty offences would become crimes, and the 
rest would become administrative torts.
Keywords: petty offences, relationship between petty of-
fence, crime and administrative tort, evolution of Polish 
petty offence law
1. Introduction1
The aim of this article is to present the basic features of Polish petty of-
fence law from a historical perspective, against the background of the 
model of petty offence law developed in the German and Austrian doc-
trine, which has become an inspiration for Polish solutions, with reference 
to Swiss literature, where the mutual relationship between offences and 
administrative torts is similar to that in Poland. The study is limited to 
meta-legal issues, with little reference to procedural distinctions referring 
to particular forms of criminal acts within a criminal case.2 The evolution 
1 The article is funded by the National Science Centre in Poland under the pro-
ject “Reforma prawa wykroczeń” [The reform of petty offense law] No. UMO-2016/23/B/
HS5/03616.
2 Of course, there are distinctions in the procedural recognition of conduct (petty of-
fence or administrative transgression). Their detailed analysis at the procedural level would 
pose the problem of ne bis in idem, which could be the subject of a separate study. Such 
attempts have been made many times in recent years, e.g. (see Luchtman, 2018, p. 1725; 
Lo Schiavo, 2018, p. 648) judgment of the ECtHR (Appl. Nos. 24130/11 and 29758/11) 
Strasbourg 16.11.2016; It should be borne in mind that the authors focused in the main part 
on substantive legal issues, treating the problem of ne bis in idem as secondary in relation to 
the whole issue. As a side note, it should be noted that recent case-law slightly changes the 
traditional approach to the ne bis in idem rule. In particular, attention should be drawn to 
the judgment of the ECtHR (Appl. Nos. 24130/11 and 29758/11) Strasbourg 16.11.2016. 
Admittedly, as we read in the grounds of that judgment, “the ne bis in idem principle is 
mainly concerned with due process, which is the object of Art. 6, and is less concerned with 
the substance of the criminal law than Art. 7”, this or another understanding of it obviously 
affects the scope of the legal consequences borne by the convicted person. Undoubtedly, the 
recent case-law of the ECtHR does not fundamentally alter the standard that cases formally 
considered as administrative should be considered as criminal if they display the charac-
teristics that the ECtHR pointed out in the Engel judgement (Appl. 5100/71; 5101/71; 
5102/71; 5354/72;5370/72, Strasbourg 8.06.1976). This case-law, in particular the judgment 
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of petty offence law in Polish law is the fundamental research problem 
of this study, presenting model assumptions. This analysis illustrates in 
sharp focus the problem of the relationship between petty offence and 
administrative tort. The characteristics of the Polish system, which will 
be presented in detail, made this problem general and systemic. The rela-
tionship between the categories of petty offence and administrative tort 
is not clear in principle. Even more so, it cannot be clear on the grounds 
of specific solutions.3 A specificity of Polish solutions is the fact that the 
area which in a number of European countries is occupied by adminis-
trative-criminal law or the law of petty offences, in Poland is managed 
by both of these categories appearing together. This specific situation is 
the result of historical development, which will be discussed later in this 
work.4
in A and B vs Norway (Appl. Nos. 24130/11 and 29758/11), has resulted in a re-evaluation 
of the assessment criteria, what is “the same case” (Zolotukhin, Appl. 14939/03, Strasbourg 
10. 02.2009). This is currently understood differently from the standard established by the 
Zolotukhin judgment. Without going into a detailed assessment of the judgment in A and B 
v Norway, it is worth stating that the four criteria identified by the ECtHR, four substantive 
conditions which must be fulfilled for cumulative administrative and criminal penalties to 
be acceptable (proceedings pursuing complementary aims and addressing different aspects 
of the social misconduct at issue; foreseeability of the combination of penalties; no dupli-
cation of the collection and assessment of evidence; and an offsetting mechanism between 
the administrative and criminal penalties), do not substantially change the Engel standard. 
The ECtHR rightly states in its Engel judgment that “It is self-evident that there are crim-
inal cases which do not carry any significant degree of stigma. There are clearly “criminal 
charges” of differing weight. What is more, the autonomous interpretation adopted by the 
Convention institutions of the notion of a “criminal charge” by applying the Engel criteria 
have underpinned a gradual broadening of the criminal head to cases not strictly belonging 
to the traditional categories of the criminal law, for example administrative penalties ..., pris-
on disciplinary proceedings ..., customs law ..., competition law ..., and penalties imposed 
by a court with jurisdiction in financial matters .... Tax surcharges differ from the hard core 
of criminal law; consequently, the criminal-head guarantees will not necessarily apply with 
their full stringency.”
3 Therefore, the pandemic restrictions that have recently attracted the attention of 
the doctrine, although they are highly controversial, from a structural point of view do not 
bring anything new to the analysis of the issue. The scale of the pandemic restriction has 
renewed interest in the problem of the mutual relation between an offence and an admin-
istrative offence, but the pandemic regulations do not introduce any changes in the model 
approach. See e.g. the Act of 5 December 2008 on prevention and control of infections and 
infectious diseases in humans.
4 This model is used in Switzerland, too (see e.g. Niggli & Meader, 2011, p. 443; 
Jaag, 2010, p. 151).
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The basic research thesis is the statement that Polish petty offence law 
has evolved from criminal-administrative law5 to a subcategory of criminal 
law, which has created an empty space, that was developed by repressive 
administrative law.6 This is the reason why in Polish law, apart from crim-
inal law, there is law of petty offences and repressive administrative law, 
while in most European countries we are dealing with only one of them. 
However, it is factually unjustified and therefore should be changed. The 
source of this state of affairs is the specificity of the development of Polish 
petty offence law in the years 1928-1971, which determined its current 
shape. The evolution of petty offence law was preceded by an intensive 
scientific discussion, consciously referring to the arrangements of Ger-
man literature. The deliberation led to the introduction in 1928 of the 
law of petty offences in the form that best reflected the legislator’s sense. 
The regulations introduced in 1928 did not decree theoretical disputes, 
but allowed for various interpretations. However, they ensured on the 
one hand the efficiency of resolving cases, and on the other, a high lev-
el of guarantee. Nevertheless, further evolution of petty offence law was 
significantly influenced by political factors in the years 1945-1956. The 
legislator no longer avoided settling theoretical disputes, trying to directly 
shape petty offence law as a form of administrative law. After that peri-
od, as a reaction, there was a reversal of this concept. Consequently, the 
Code of Petty Offences of 1971, still in force today, made petty offence 
law a subcategory of criminal law. This procedure, however, generated an 
empty space in the place previously occupied by petty offence law. It was 
filled by administrative tort law, the existence of which generated addi-
tional theoretical and practical problems.
Polish petty offence law in its current form performs the same functions 
as administrative sanctions do in many European countries. On the other 
hand, in the Polish system there are also the above-mentioned adminis-
trative sanctions which perform the same role as everywhere else. This is 
5 That is, from a model belonging to administrative law.
6 This issue will be analysed in detail below. However, it is worth briefly explaining 
that criminal administrative law in the original sense given by Goldschmidt (1902) was in 
fact administrative law. This is also how the authors of the draft of the Polish petty offense 
law seemed to understand it (except for Rappaport – see below). Some doctrine still under-
stands it this way, as will be discussed below. Meanwhile, this law has become a subcategory 
of criminal law.
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an atypical situation – apart from Poland, it still occurs in Switzerland, but 
nowhere else.7
The article uses the methods of historical – legal and formal – dogmatic 
research. References are made to the Polish and German literature on the 
subject, which was created during the shaping of the analysed regulations, 
concerning theoretical issues relevant to the topic, and to historical-legal 
and theoretical studies created nowadays.
3. Discussion
3.1. Reflections on the Status of the Petty Offence
In most European countries, repressive law in the broad sense usually 
consists of criminal law and criminal-administrative law, often referred 
to as petty offence law. The latter may be similar either to administrative 
or to criminal law. In this respect, Polish regulations are unusual. There 
is both petty offence law similar to criminal law, and repressive adminis-
trative law. A situation similar to that in Poland is found in Switzerland, 
where the Swiss doctrine, while acknowledging the existence of the prob-
lem, declares that it is actually difficult to determine the reasons for this 
situation (Niggli & Meader, 2011, p. 443; Jaag, 2010, p. 151). In Poland 
this is the result of quite a long development.  
Creation of the concept of modern petty offence law is traditionally as-
sociated with the words of Goldschmidt (1902). This is not entirely accu-
rate, as there was already the so-called police law, performing the function 
of petty offence law (Schwander, 1952, p. 12; Eser, 1961, p. 16; Ohana, 
2014, p. 12; Härter, 1999; Härter, 2007; Kulik, 2020, p. 93). However, it 
was Goldschmidt who introduced into the scientific debate the problem 
of the status of petty offence law, its relation to administrative and crim-
inal law. The discussion that started with his speech continues in Germa-
ny to this day. Therefore, there are two main groups of positions. One 
includes the concepts that crime and offence differ only in seriousness 
(quantitative concepts) (Baumann, 1961;1972; Gürtler, 1990;2012; Jes-
check, 1959; Krümpelmann, 1966, p. 166; Mattes, 1970; Müller, 2018, 
7 This means, moreover, that Polish petty offense law can be compared in some re-
spects both with criminal offences known in other European countries and with administra-
tive penalties.
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p. 9; Müller–Dalhoff, 1993, p. 107; Theisen & Vesper, 2010, p. 13). As 
a part of the second, which originates from Goldschmidt and his succes-
sors, in particular Schmidt (1949; 1948), there are qualitative differences 
between them (qualitative and quantitative-qualitative concepts) (Eser, 
1961, p. 128; Cramer, 1971, p. 17; Rebmann, Roth & Hermann, 1996, p. 
10; Mitsch, 1995; Salem, 2009, p. 2; Bohnert, 2000). 
The positions in the discussion that took place in Poland in the 1920s 
and 1930s were very similar. This consideration would probably have con-
tinued in the following years, if not for the events that followed World 
War II. These facts meant that while German petty offence law under the 
Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten of 1952 still entitles us to present both 
of these positions, Polish petty offence law may (compared to German 
criminal-administrative law) be considered as a form of “small criminal 
law” (Heine, 1999). The development of Polish petty offence law has gone 
from repressive administrative law to the subcategory of criminal law. As 
a result, an empty normative space appeared in the place previously oc-
cupied by criminal and administrative law, which was already filled. Over 
time, repressive administrative law developed alongside petty offence law. 
The debate in Germany on the concept of Goldschmidt coincided with 
the work on the systemic regulation of petty offence law in the Polish 
legal order, and it was reflected in the Polish discussion conducted in 
the years 1920-1939. The positions were polarised almost immediately 
(Lityński, 1991, pp. 56-57; Łysko, 2016, p. 26; Skupiński, 1974, p. 76; 
Marek, 1967). According to Juliusz Makarewicz, the chairman of the 
Criminal Law Codification Committee, liability for administrative breach 
should qualitatively differ from criminal liability. Following Goldschmidt, 
he assumed that crime is a direct attack on the subject of protection, and 
a petty offence is a disobedience to legal order. Therefore, responsibility 
for them is a form of administrative responsibility (Makarewicz, 1920, 
Powrotna; Makarewicz, 1924, p. 6; Makarewicz, 1920, Granice).  An-
other member of the Committee, Rappaport, presented a view similar to 
that expressed in Germany by the most serious critics of Goldschmidt’s 
concept: Beling (1891) and Frank (1897, p. 18; 1905). He argued that 
between criminal law and petty offence law there is no qualitative differ-
ence, but a quantitative one – they differ in the level of criminal repre-
hensibility. However, for practical reasons, he considered it was necessary 
to relieve the courts from examining cases of breach of order, or at least 
some of them. He suggested dividing administrative torts into more se-
rious and minor ones. The former would not only be directly related to 
specific fields of administration’s activity but also punishable by arrest. 
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These cases would be examined by criminal courts. The latter acts, con-
cerning specific forms of administrative activity, would be examined by 
administrative authorities (Rappaport, 1919).
Basically, this discussion has not been settled. The legislator did not de-
cide it either. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1921 pro-
vided that everyone had the right to a fair trial (Art. 98). Nevertheless, it 
also stipulated in Art. 72 that criminal matters could also be adjudicated 
by administrative authorities under judicial control. Therefore, the fact 
that the Act of 22 March 1928 on criminal-administrative proceedings 
referred the jurisprudence to administrative authorities, did not prejudge 
the nature of petty offence law. Likewise, it was not determined by the 
regulation of the President of the Republic of Poland of 11 July 1932, the 
Act on Petty Offences, which shaped liability for a petty offence similar 
to administrative liability, but with significant elements making it similar 
to criminal responsibility (Jakubowska–Hara, 2004, p. 8; Łysko, 2016, p. 
26-27). It was a compromise solution, yet closer to the dualistic concept 
of Rappaport than to the penal-administrative structure of Makarewicz 
(Kulik, 2020, p. 139).
The discussion lasted until the outbreak of World War II and was briefly 
resumed after its end. Most often, crime and petty offences were perceived 
as acts of a similar nature – the difference between them was not seen 
as qualitative, but a quantitative one (Glaser & Mogilnicki, 1934, p. 54; 
Makowski, 1937, p. 64; Bojarski, 1990), yet there were also well-founded 
different views (Wolter, 1947, p. 76). 
3.2.  A Discussion of the Status of Petty Offence During the 
Formative Years of Real Socialism in Poland
After the end of the war, this discussion had to take place in diametrically 
changed socio-political conditions. A new view of the political authorities 
appeared on the role of law and the judiciary. While the pre-war legislator 
tried to avoid resolving theoretical and legal problems, the post-war legisla-
tor considered it necessary. It was assumed that the judicature in cases of 
petty offences is a tool for the implementation of the educational tasks of 
the administration, when criminal law is used to fight the class enemy (Zim-
mermann, 1956, p. 420; Mieńszagin & Wyszyńska, 1953, p. 11).8 Based 
8 It is interestingly analysed by Łysko today (2016, p. 35).
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on this assumption, there was official support for a kind of simplified qual-
itative concept (Bachrach, 1953, p. 32; Rajkowski, 1955, p. 62; Litwin, 
1955; Rybicki, 1956; Mieńszagin & Wyszyńska, 1953, p. 11).9 However, 
its promotion by the authorities was to cause distrust of Polish theorists 
in any qualitative approach in the future.10
Initially, voices critical of qualitative concepts were rare. Only Iserzon ar-
gued that not only a crime, but also a petty offence, violates the interests 
of the ruling class, so there is no reason to regard them as different entities 
(Iserzon, 1959).
Until 1956, qualitative approaches influenced the shape of the legisla-
tion. The main effect of their application was that while criminal law was 
strict and became more and more severe, the petty offence law between 
1944 and 1956 definitely softened (Lityński, 2010, p. 7). Petty offence 
law, while playing an educational role, could be mild. It was supposed to 
implement the so-called concept of democratic upbringing – to eliminate 
“anti-social individuality” and selfishness, which were considered to be 
partly innate and partly caused by improper upbringing in the conditions 
of traditional society. It was supposed to support the creation of a social-
ised, pro-socially oriented person (Klaus, 2013). 
On the other hand, a reverse tendency was noticeable, resulting from the 
efforts to simplify the procedure in matters considered important for the 
existence of state. A whole range of behaviours, which should be consid-
ered as criminal offences due to the importance and subject matter of pro-
tection, were formally moved beyond criminal law (Marek, 1996, p. 27).11 
They were prosecuted under the administrative procedure provided for 
in the Act of 15 December 1951 on criminal-administrative judgments. 
Extrajudicial bodies adjudicated in administrative proceedings (Jastrzęb-
ski, 1956; Daręgowski, 1959; Lewiński, 1977, p. 3; Łysko, 2016; Łysko, 
2016, p. 37), created in a similar way as criminal proceedings, but without 
judicial control, typical of pre-war solutions.
After 1956 (the period of the so-called “thaw”), there was general leni-
ency of criminal law, but a stricter punishment for petty offences. This 
9 What draws attention in particular is the view of W. Mieńszagin and Z. Wyszyńska, 
which contradicts the principles of common sense, that the difference between criminal law 
and petty offense law arose from the fact that the quantitative difference between them (the 
level of social danger of an act) was so large that it became a qualitative difference.
10 It is noted by Łysko (2016, p. 38).
11 Structurally, this solution was similar to the Austrian one.
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was expressed in the amendment to the Act on criminal-administrative 
judgments in 1958 (Łysko, 2017), which, at the same time, reduced the 
very extensive structure of penal-administrative judgments (Łysko, 2016).
In the literature, the opinion that petty offence law belongs to the broadly 
understood criminal law gained advantage (Dąbrowski, 1967; Sziszow, 
1961;12 Dąbrowski, 1970, p. 34; Rybicki & Sobczak, 1957), which meant 
that it was no longer considered a purely educational area of law. It did 
not have to be as gentle as it had been before. The “thaw” also opened 
the way for a serious discussion on what exactly petty offence law is and 
how it should be shaped for the future. There were several important the-
oretical statements, which were dominated by an aversion to qualitative 
views, discredited during the Stalinist period. Extremely important for the 
future of the Polish petty offence law was the statement by an outstanding 
dogmatist of the new generation, Kubicki, who explicitly stated that petty 
offence law was nothing else than the remnants of criminal law that did 
not fit into the Criminal Code (Kubicki, 1961, p. 501). At the same time, 
there was a well-established view of the appropriateness of the solution 
consisting in maintaining the division of criminal offences into misde-
meanours and crimes. There was no intention to introduce a third catego-
ry of criminal offences, which resulted in the appearance of petty offences 
as a quasi-crime, outside of the strict criminal law, but within criminal 
law in the broad sense (Andrejew, 1955; Jakubowska-Hara, 2004, p. 82; 
Łysko, 2016, pp. 45-46).
A fierce dispute over the desired status of a petty offence continued in 
the course of work on the 1971 Code of Petty Offences. There were con-
flicting views within the working group that a petty offence was an ad-
ministrative lawlessness (Lenieli, 1961) or that it was a form of criminal 
law (Kubicki, 1961, pp. 498-499; Iserzon, 1961). This has led to a state 
of petty offence law having characteristics that can be linked more to 
criminal law than to administrative law. The decision to suspend work on 
the Code of Petty Offences until the Penal Code of 1969 was drafted. It 
was indicated as the final victory for the concept of the affiliation of petty 
offence law with the broadly understood criminal law. Only then was the 
work on the 1971 Code of Petty Offences completed (Jakubowska-Hara, 
2004, p. 58; Łysko, 2015).
The passage of the bill of 17 June 1966 was an important factor in the 
transfer of certain minor offences as petty offences to criminal-adminis-
12 See the contemporary analysis by Łysko (2016, p. 45).
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trative judgments. It was an expression of the tendency to transform mi-
nor crimes into petty offences, which was further deepened by the Code 
of Petty Offences of 1971 (Marek, 1996, p. 26). The transfer of numerous 
criminal offences to the category of petty offences made it nearly impossi-
ble to perceive petty offence law as law of breach of order.
3.3. The Formation of the Relationship of Petty Offence 
Law to Administrative-Criminal Law
Therefore, the view of a purely qualitative difference between petty of-
fence law and criminal law is no longer present in the modern doctrine. 
It either takes the position that petty offence law is a hybrid of criminal 
and administrative law (Kubicki, 1961, p. 501; Budyn-Kulik, 2012), or 
it is considered to be a separate area of  criminal law in the broad sense 
(Gostyński, 1982, p. 13; Radecki, 2009; Marek, 2010; Vachev, 2016). The 
status of a petty offence as a being functioning between administrative 
law and criminal law could not be changed by subsequent amendments 
to petty offence law. The criminal law component of the petty offence 
was strengthened by the transfer of adjudication in these cases to courts, 
which took place in 2001.
Eventually, it must be admitted that Polish petty offence law, at least to 
some extent, is “small criminal law”, and numerous petty offences are 
“small crimes” (Budyn-Kulik, 2017). The solution adopted by the Polish 
legislator generated many tangential areas requiring resolution. For exam-
ple, theft of things up to PLN 500 is basically known as a petty offence, 
and above this value it is a crime. This rather strange status of Polish petty 
offence law has two different effects. The first is the one mentioned by 
Vachev – it is impossible to look at Polish petty offence law as a homoge-
neous structure, and thus it is impossible to provide criteria that would 
qualitatively characterise an offence – apart from a purely formal refer-
ence to the statutory definition of a petty offence. The second effect is the 
one that Marek writes about – since it is not known how to qualitatively 
characterise a petty offense, because it is both criminal and administra-
tive tort, it is not known how it differs from a crime (Marek, 2010, p. 33). 
Therefore, there are no criteria which should be followed by the legislator 
when describing an act as a crime or a petty offence.
However, the evolution that Polish petty offence law has undergone – 
from order law to small criminal law, has generated an empty space – 
there was no order law in the strict sense. That is why repressive adminis-
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trative law appeared. The first case of such liability was introduced by the 
decree of 28 January 1953 on securing the rational and economical use 
of electricity and heat. Originally, liability for an administrative tort could 
only be assumed by legal persons (Radecki, 2019, pp. 30-31), and this 
was a feature that differentiated criminal liability (for a criminal offence 
or petty offence) from administrative tort liability. The doctrine usual-
ly assumed that it is a kind of administrative responsibility (Domański, 
1976; Wolter, 1973). With time, it became possible to bring people to 
administrative tort liability, which meant that the clear line between the 
spheres reserved for administrative and criminal liability was blurred. This 
is how a separate form of responsibility appeared, which Szumiło-Kulczy-
cka aptly called administrative-criminal liability. The author distinguished 
this form of liability from criminal liability, which is liability for a crime, 
and which in the course of evolution became liability for a petty offence 
(Szumiło-Kulczycka, 2004, p. 29). Most authors consider it formally as a 
sub-category of administrative liability (Domański, 1976; Wolter, 1973), 
but in fact it has many features of criminal responsibility. This is an ex-
pression of a general tendency, sometimes referred to as the conversion 
of criminal liability into repressive administrative responsibility (Danecka, 
2018, p. 50). Currently, the status of this type of liability is the subject of 
intense discussion in Polish literature, while representatives of the doc-
trine of administrative law usually regard it as a form of administrative lia-
bility (Błachucki, 2015),13 and representatives of the doctrine of penal law 
– as a form of liability, if not criminal, then a repressive one (Skupiński, 
2003; Kmieciak, 1997; Wróbel, 2011; Mozgawa & Kulik, 2016). Also, in 
the judicature of the Constitutional Tribunal, it is assumed that the ne bis 
in idem rule must be applied to the concurrence of criminal liability and 
administrative tort liability,14 following the judicature of the ECtHR.15
13 Speaks in a similar way: Stahl, 2011, p. 18.
14 E.g. judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, (K 17/97), Warsaw, 29.4.1998; judg-
ment of the Constitutional Tribunal, (P 26/06), Warsaw, 15.4.2008; judgment of the Consti-
tutional Tribunal, (P 29/09), Warsaw, 18.11.2010; judgment of the Supreme Court, (I KZP 
27/08), Warsaw, 17.12.2008.
15 E.g. judgment of the ECtHR, (5100/71), Strasbourg, 8.6.1976; judgment of the 
ECtHR, (9912/82), Strasbourg, 25.8.1987; judgment of the ECtHR (11034/84), Stras-
bourg, 22.5.1990; judgment of the ECtHR, (18996/91), Strasbourg, 24.8.1997. See also 
Gullikson, 2015 p. 143; Bailleux, 2014, p. 139.
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3.4.  Doubts about the Current Shape and Relationship of 
Petty Offence Law to Administrative-Criminal Law
Thus, Polish law currently knows three categories of criminal acts – crimes, 
petty offences, and administrative torts. The first two give rise to crimi-
nal liability (Radecki, 1994; Radecki, 2014; Danecka, 2018, p. 35; Błach-
nio-Parzych, 2016). The status of administrative tort liability is not clear. 
As it is known, on the basis of Art. 6 of the ECtHR, cases for acts that are 
administrative torts under Polish law, among others, can be considered as 
criminal cases. The formal classification of the act is preselective and does 
not prejudge anything. It is important whether the sanction is general and 
abstract, what norm imposes it, whether responsibility depends on guilt, 
and finally, whether it is possible to impose a penalty of deprivation of 
liberty.16 On the other hand, the Polish legislator does not always attach 
importance to respecting the division of law into branches, which means 
that there may be cases when a legal act does not fall within a single field 
of law (Kruk, 2013, p. 149). This is relevant to the issue under analysis 
(Mozgawa & Kulik, 2016, p. 38). 
The Polish Constitutional Court considers tort administrative liability as 
criminal liability in the constitutional sense. Therefore, it accepts the ne-
cessity of applying the ne bis in idem rule to cases of concurrence of crim-
inal liability and administrative tort liability17 (Daniluk, 2010; Król-Bo-
gomilska, 2012). The historical development of Polish criminal offence 
law and repressive administrative law presented above convinces that the 
difference between a criminal act and an administrative tort can be quite 
easily perceived in the formal sense. In the substantive sense, not only a 
case of a crime or a petty offence, but also a case of an administrative tort 
as it is defined in Polish law should be considered as a criminal case.
However, in the Polish doctrine of administrative law, most often respon-
sibility for an administrative tort is considered administrative. It is as-
sumed that the administrative sanction, also repressive, is natural, and 
the intensity of administrative repression is only apparent. It reflects the 
threat posed by the violation of administrative regulations. It is an expres-
16 Judgment of the ECtHR (14939/03), Strasbourg, 10.2.2009; judgment of the EC-
tHR (7819/77), Strasbourg, 10.2.1984; judgment of the ECtHR (9912/82), Strasbourg, 
28.6.1987.
17 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, (P 26/06), Warsaw, 15.04.2008; judgment 
of the Constitutional Tribunal, (P 29/09), Warsaw, 18.11.2010; judgment of the Supreme 
Court, (I KZP 27/08), Warsaw, 17.12.2008 
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sion of special protection of public interest, and its amount is adapted to 
the material situation of the addressees of norms and the intensity of the 
violation of public interest (Błachucki, 2015). It is worth noting critically 
that administrative torts often concern matters not directly related to the 
process of administration, and they operate with a sanction so onerous 
that it is difficult to imagine the possibility of imposing it in a state gov-
erned by the rule of law other than in a process that ensures impartial 
examination of the case by a court adjudicating on a fault basis (Wier-
zbowski, 2005; Kulik, 2020, p. 139; Szumiło-Kulczycka, 2004, p. 26).
It is the reliance on the principle of guilt and the existence of sentencing 
principles that are the essential features of criminal punishment. Dan-
ecka expresses the position that in some (rare) cases of administrative 
responsibility it is possible to see some elements of guilt (Danecka, 2018, 
p. 35). In turn, a substitute for the principles of penalty assessment was 
introduced into the Code of Administrative Procedure by the Act of 7 
April 2017 amending the Act-Code of Administrative Procedure and 
some other acts in the form of Section IVa on administrative fines. Art. 
189b of the Polish Administrative Procedure Code (KPA) provides that 
an administrative fine is a pecuniary sanction imposed by a public ad-
ministration body by way of a decision as a result of a violation of law 
involving a failure to comply with an obligation or a breach of a prohibi-
tion imposed on a natural person, a legal person, or an organisational unit 
without legal personality. Further provisions deal with the conflict of laws 
in time, the principles of penalty assessment, exclusion of liability due to 
force majeure, cases of waiver of punishment, the statute of limitations, 
and mitigation of penalties.
This regulation introduces a criminal law element to administrative regu-
lation, but it is criticised as not being sufficiently guaranteeive (Danecka, 
2018, p. 116). It also gives no indication of what repressive administrative 
liability is (Kulik, 2020, p. 159), although the way it is regulated indicates 
that formally it is something different from criminal liability. It is usually 
not based on the principle of guilt, and it is ruled by an administrative 
body rather than a court (Stankiewicz, 2017). In the formal sense, it is 
administrative responsibility, but in the Polish doctrine the very under-
standing of administrative responsibility and its general criteria are not 
clear (Filipek, 1963; Wincenciak, 2008; Stankiewicz, 2017). Sometimes it 
is even assumed that it is such a responsibility that is neither criminal nor 
civil (Kwaśnicka, 2011). This is an insufficient approach (Kulik, 2020, p. 
161). It is much better to talk about linking the sanction to the non-per-
formance of an obligation imposed by the administrative body (Lewicki, 
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2002; Wincenciak, 2008; Szydło, 2003; Kruk, 2013, p. 110). Determining 
the limits of administrative responsibility involves defining its fundamen-
tal purpose, which coincides with the purpose of public administration 
(Stefaniuk, 2009; Kruk, 2013, p. 109). Secondly, in the analysed case it is 
about this form of administrative responsibility, which is connected with 
the application of administrative coercion (Kruk, 2009).
Undoubtedly, both in the case of criminal law and administrative law, 
responsibility arises from the violation of the law (Wincenciak, 2008; Stel-
masiak, 1993). Those who write that the purpose of repressive administra-
tive law is to ensure respect for the law, and the purpose of criminal law 
is only repression, are wrong (Kruk, 2013, p. 109; Starzyński, 2013; Ušak, 
2010). After all, the purpose of criminal law is, among others, prevention 
(Mozgawa & Kulik 2016, p. 41; Danecka, 2018, p. 49), whereby preven-
tion is best realised by liability based on the principle of guilt (Danecka, 
2018, p. 36; Kulik. 2020, p. 161). Criminal law is repressive in nature, but 
the same can be said of administrative tort law. Both operate a nuisance 
as a sanction (Szumiło-Kulczycka, 2004, p. 26). Wincenciak rightly notes 
that the method of regulation used in repressive administrative law is es-
sentially criminal law – a prohibition is created, and its violation is subject 
to a repressive sanction (Wincenciak, 2008). The view that since crimi-
nal penalties are imposed by the court, and administrative penalties by a 
non-judicial body, the latter are not the administration of criminal justice 
is not convincing (Nowicki & Peszkowski, 2016). Also, the view that there 
is always a difference between criminal and administrative sanctions in 
terms of severity is not accurate, since administrative law operates only 
with a financial penalty, and criminal law also with sanctions that violate 
civil liberties and rights (Nowicki & Peszkowski 2016). Modern criminal 
law operates very extensively with fines, and administrative fines can be 
extremely harsh.
Wierzbowski is quite right when he writes that an administrative sanc-
tion should not be repressive in nature but should consist of enforcement, 
nullity, or possibly compensation (Wierzbowski, 2005). However, as Zim-
mermann wrote, if administrative acts are to be truly effective, they must 
contain sanctions. If an administrative body had no means to carry out its 
will, administration would be impossible (Zimmermann, 1956, p. 400). In 
other words, administrative sanctions serve the efficiency of administra-
tion (Danecka, 2018, p. 114). In this sense, an administrative sanction in 
the form of a fine is a necessary tool of administrative law (Szydło, 2003; 
Michór, 2009; Kulik, 2020, p. 164). Classical administrative law operates 
admittedly different types of sanctions: enforcement (which sometimes 
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take the form of penalties to compel behaviour consistent with the de-
mands of the authority), sanctions depriving or limiting the right, con-
cession, permit, or consent (Wincenciak, 2008). This set of sanctions was 
sufficient in classical administrative law (Longchamps, 1967), but nowa-
days the administrative monetary “penalty” is an effective tool of adminis-
trative coercion (Nowicki & Peszkowski, 2016).
Therefore, not all cases of repressive administrative liability should be 
considered as part of criminal law. Since we are talking about a repressive 
sanction, a criminal law factor in the constitutional sense will always be 
present here. This does not mean that there cannot be an administrative 
element, which allows the perception of a repressive administrative sanc-
tion as an acceptable and desirable entity on the grounds of administrative 
law. This is determined by what has often been forgotten in the course of 
the historical development of the Polish petty offence law and administra-
tive repressive law – ratio legis of responsibility (Malanowski, 2009). In the 
case of administrative tort liability, ratio legis is to ensure the proper exer-
cise of authority by administrative bodies. Nowicki and Peszkowski aptly 
write that while criminal penalties are imposed for fundamental violations 
of the principles concerning the coexistence of people in the community, 
administrative penalties sanction violations of norms that are often tech-
nical in nature and are an additional means used by the administration to 
enforce laws (Nowicki & Peszkowski, 2016). Thus, where the violation of 
certain protected goods is directly involved, criminal law steps in. Where it 
is a question of violating the quality of the process of administration – lia-
bility for administrative tort comes into play. This does not mean that ad-
ministrative tort law is not concerned with the protection of legal goods, 
since the process of administration is intended to achieve goals that are 
beneficial to the state (Frank, 1897, p. 18). The moral reprehensibility of 
administrative tort stems from the fact that it impedes administration, 
which is intended to be beneficial to the community.
3.5.  Relation of the Polish Legal State to Theoretical 
Models of Criminal-Administrative Responsibility
The above approach shows some similarity to certain quantitative and qual-
itative German concepts. To some extent, it is similar to Schmidt’s model 
of sozialetische Unrechtbewertung. According to him, the substantive lawless-
ness of a crime manifests itself in the violation or endangerment of the 
sphere of interests of social life. It is based on the violation of some moral 
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value, when in the case of a petty offence only the interest of maintaining 
order is violated and not the interest of the possessor of some concrete ob-
ject of protection (Schmidt, 1949, p. 230). Unlike Schmidt, we believe that 
this does not mean that there is no assault on a legal good in the case of an 
orderly transgression. All violations of legal norms in some sense are such 
an attack.  Thus, this view is closer to the position of Eser, who believes that 
crimes should be acts that attack a legal good in a manner proportional to 
the punishment provided for them by law, and petty offences should be 
acts that violate orderly social norms, for which the law provides protection 
(Eser, 1961). It may be added that in the case of a breach of order, the 
protected good appears in the further background – these are the values 
protected by proper administration (Kulik, 2020, p. 172).
The above distinction may seem quite clear at first glance. However, this 
is so only if one considers the pure model itself, and thus purely theoret-
ically. When making such distinctions, it is relatively easy to make pure 
model distinctions. This is what has characterised the approaches pre-
sented in the German or Austrian literature over the years. In each case, 
an attempt was made to make a clear distinction not on the basis of some 
real legal state, but on the basis of some imaginary world, which is an im-
age of some conceivable reality. 
This, it should be strongly emphasised, is a significant advantage of such 
an approach. Operating on any existing legal state, the researcher inevita-
bly gets entangled in a number of circumstances that obscure the picture, 
thus making it impossible to develop models of responsibility. Departing 
from the existing legal state, we have the opportunity to create a poten-
tially correct construction, because it is not burdened by various back-
grounds. It is worth emphasising that the construction of Goldschmidt, 
cited at the beginning, was not created in a social reality in which ad-
ministrative-criminal law, or police law, did not exist.  Such law did exist. 
German states have long had a category of police misconduct alongside 
criminal offences, regulated by laws of an administrative nature. At first, 
the existence of such regulations was not associated with theoretical re-
flection on them. Besides, the relation of this police lawlessness to crim-
inal lawlessness was not clear for a long time. It can even be argued that 
police lawlessness simply included the most minor crimes, and that it was 
included in criminal law in a broad sense, recognising the criminal law 
nature of police transgression, although – which should be emphasised – 
liability was formally of an administrative nature. Relatively quickly there 
were attempts to theoretically master the normative reality that had been 
found. Feuerbach was already of the opinion that in the case of a crime, 
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we are dealing with behaviour that directly violates human law. Where 
this right is not attacked, we can only deal with police lawlessness. In 
this sense, substantively, a police tort is simply an administrative violation 
for which the state uses a punishment shaped like a criminal one, albe-
it a milder one. This concept is worth remembering if only because the 
underlying idea for solving the problem of the status of police law is not 
very far from what Goldschmidt later proposed (Feuerbach, 1801; 1822). 
However, what Feuerbach, and shortly after him Köstlin, proposed in 
arguing that crime constitutes real lawlessness (wirkliches Unrecht), and 
police transgression is potential lawlessness (mögliches Unrecht) (Köstlin, 
1845), was a brilliant conception of mastery over the existing world. In 
making this attempt, neither Feuerbach nor Köstlin faced any pressing 
intellectual need to master normative phenomena. The description thus 
included a diagnosis of the normative status of the law of order, but did 
not involve an attempt to shape it.
In contrast, Goldschmidt’s concept was the idea of creating a model of 
an imagined normative reality that could be arranged according to some 
preconceived rational pattern. A very similar task would be undertaken 
several decades later by Schmidt, constructing the assumptions of Ger-
man petty offence law after World War II. The same task was faced by 
Rappaport and Makarewicz while constructing the assumptions of petty 
offence law in the first years of independent Poland, as well as by the au-
thors of the Polish Code of Petty Offence of 1971.
The social situations in which a complete re-evaluation of thinking about 
criminal-administrative responsibility was carried out show a certain 
similarity. In all of these cases, there was a huge expansion of repres-
sive administrative legislation, and they were usually undertaken in a very 
particular social situation. Neither Feuerbach nor Köstlin had to make as-
sumptions about a system of administrative law. Police law regulations in 
their time existed, expanded, but did not pose a great normative problem 
because they did not enter the territory traditionally reserved for criminal 
law, and moreover, the scale of their operation was not great.
It was different in the case of the attempts at a systematic development 
of petty offence law made by Goldschmidt, Schmidt, Polish codifiers of 
the 1930s, and then of the 1960s. In all these cases, there was a great 
development of administrative-criminal law, which replaced criminal law. 
In German literature it is noted that the period from 1871 to 1914 was 
associated with a rapid arrival of non-code laws, which from the theoret-
ical point of view could not be classified unambiguously as criminal or 
administrative law, which blurred the distinction between criminal and 
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administrative law. It was significant that some laws introduced a regu-
lation, according to which the proper procedure was an administrative 
proceeding, but at the request of the offender the case was heard by the 
court in criminal proceedings (Bohnert, 2000). These regulations were 
therefore actually criminal-administrative hybrids.
It should be added that they concerned cases of various degrees of com-
plexity, sometimes quite serious. It was on the basis of such a legal state 
that Goldschmidt’s concept appeared. Significant for the further develop-
ment of criminal, administrative, and administrative-criminal law was the 
legislation of the years 1933-1945, which was characterised by a large-
scale replacement of classical criminal regulations with typical adminis-
trative regulations, especially in the area of protection of the economic 
market. This was the classical law of war (not unlike the years 1871-1914) 
(Ohana, 2014, p. 18). Besides, also in the period just after World War II, 
there was no quick departure in Germany from the wide replacement of 
classical criminal law regulations by administrative, quasi-administrative, 
or perhaps quasi-criminal regulations. This was fostered by the need to 
run the economy in the conditions of the post-war crisis on non-market 
principles (Schmidt, 1948). Under such conditions, the reflection on the 
status of administrative-criminal law was undertaken by Schmidt. Maka-
rewicz and Rappaport worked in the period after World War I, moreo-
ver, in a legal state largely shaped by the war economy – identically to 
Goldschmidt and Schmidt.  Also, the systemic reflection undertaken on 
the status of petty offence law in the 1960s took place in a situation in 
which there was a dogmatically and axiologically questionable confusion 
between criminal law and administrative law (Łysko, 2020).
It is easy to see that periods of significant intensification of a crisis of 
some kind bring about the need to rethink the assumptions of the sys-
tem itself. There are many indications that this is exactly the situation we 
are dealing with now. Danecka rightly writes that nowadays in Poland, 
repressive administrative law more and more often simply performs the 
functions of criminal law (Danecka, 2018, p. 115). In a sense, we are 
dealing here with pure interchangeability. A notable example is the Act of 
22 June 2017 amending the Act on the protection and care of historical 
monuments and some other acts, which simply transformed a number of 
offences contained therein into administrative torts – in principle without 
any major changes in the content of the prohibition (Gadecki, 2018). This 
is not the only case of the occurrence of administrative law in the role of 
petty offence or criminal law, but this is a special example – petty offences 
were directly transformed into administrative torts.
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It seems that the development of Polish petty offence law and the emer-
gence, independently from it, of repressive administrative law caused a cer-
tain imbalance in proportions between the protection of legal goods (the 
domain of criminal law) and the protection of the process of proper admin-
istration (the domain of petty offence law or administrative-criminal law). 
In the course of evolution, acts which, because of their seriousness and 
directness in harming legal goods other than the correctness of administra-
tion, should be criminal offences, became petty offences. For this reason, 
petty offences took on the characteristics of crimes, while the empty space 
(protection of the process of administration) was occupied by administra-
tive torts. They are now fulfilling the role originally performed by the acts 
prohibited as petty offences. As indicated above – Polish petty offence law 
was originally conceived as a form of repressive administrative law, but in 
the course of development it acquired features of criminal law relating to 
minor law infringements. For both reasons, repressive administrative liabil-
ity de lege lata is becoming less and less different from criminal liability in 
the broad sense, i.e. criminal law in the narrow sense and petty offence law. 
It should be added that this approximation concerns criminalisation in the 
material sense. In the procedural sense, we are still dealing with different 
procedures. It is not unimportant for the addressee of the norm that in the 
case of an administrative tort his case is decided by an administrative body 
with subsequent judicial review, whereas in classic criminal proceedings, of 
which the petty offence proceedings are a variant, his case would be decid-
ed by a court and he would be entitled to the right of defence.
However, de lege ferenda it can be postulated that these are cases of respon-
sibility serving different purposes.  It may be assumed that repressive admin-
istrative liability comes into play in cases that are directly related to ensuring 
the regularity of administration (Kruk, 2009, p. 109; Kulik, 2020, p. 176), but 
not in all cases. It should not be allowed for acts characterised by a significant 
level of social harm. These should be crimes (Kulik, 2020, p. 179). This view is 
voiced with the awareness that nowadays repressive administrative sanctions 
are characterised by great expansiveness – they often replace criminal law, 
also where it is not substantively justified (Danecka, 2018, p. 115).
4. Conclusion
The above statement makes sense when we talk about distinguishing 
repressive administrative responsibility from criminal law in the broad 
sense, i.e. in the current legal state in Poland – from criminal law in the 
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narrow sense and petty offence law. Distinguishing petty offence law from 
criminal law on the one hand, and from repressive administrative law on 
the other hand is impossible. This is justified by the fact that petty offence 
law in its present form contains both clearly criminal acts and administra-
tive torts (Marek, 2010, p. 33). This state of affairs leads to the conclusion 
that it is possible to distinguish two branches whose general assumptions 
are more or less clear. These are: criminal law and administrative tort law. 
Petty offence law in its present form is a kind of normative neoplasm, 
shaped by years of differently directed changes. If an attempt were made 
to determine what it actually is, one would have to admit that historical 
evolution has brought it to a state in which it can be regarded as criminal 
law par excellence, with some relict features of responsibility for a public 
order offence (Kulik, 2020, p. 181).  It seems that such a hybrid is not at 
all necessary. It does not fill any empty space between criminal law and 
repressive administrative law, as they interpenetrate despite its existence. 
The original purpose of the existence of petty offence law was to cover the 
criminalisation of acts of order. This role is fulfilled today by repressive 
administrative law. Petty offence law evolved in Poland in such a way 
that it started to duplicate criminal law and administrative repressive law. 
But the starting point – as mentioned at the beginning of the paper – was 
that petty offence law was called repressive administrative responsibility. 
Petty offence law was not to exist alongside such liability, as it does today, 
but was simply to be it. No one imagined a legal state in which there is 
liability for a petty offence and liability for an administrative tort that is 
not a petty offence. Rappaport, perceiving a petty offence as a form of 
crime, was still moving in the sphere of treating the category of admin-
istrative offences he had distinguished as violations related to the sphere 
of administrative activity, and thus in the sphere of responsibility shaped 
in a manner similar to modern administrative torts, less to petty offences 
(Rappaport, 1919).
The above seems to imply that from the very idea of liability for a petty 
offence, it was originally, and perhaps should continue to be – an order 
responsibility, which would be decided by an administrative body, obvi-
ously under judicial control. It is probably no coincidence that the process 
of making petty offences more similar to crimes occurred in conjunction 
with the process of forming independent administrative responsibility of 
a repressive nature. Perhaps the most effective reform of petty offence 
law would therefore be its liquidation, combined with the transformation 
into misdemeanour of those acts that are clearly criminal in nature, and 
therefore do not directly affect the functioning of the administrative pro-
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cess, while their level of social harmfulness is high. Other petty offences, 
i.e. minor offences affecting the proper functioning of the administrative 
process, should be converted into administrative torts.
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Błachucki, M. (2015). Wstęp [Introduction]. In M. Błachucki (Ed.), Administra-
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Bojarski, T. (1990). Przestępstwo a wykroczenie [Crime versus petty offense]. 
In T. Bojarski (Ed.), Problemy ewolucji prawa karnego [Issues of the evolution of 
criminal law] (pp. 25-46). Lublin, Poland: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii 
Curie Skłodowskiej.
478
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terze administracyjnym [Offences – minor crimes or acts of an administrative 
nature]. In T. Grzegorczyk & R. Olszewski (Eds.), Verba volant, scripta manent. 
Proces karny, prawo karne skarbowe i prawo wykroczeń po zmianach z lat 2015.-
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ku z uchwaleniem ustawy z dnia 22 czerwca 2017 roku o zmianie ustawy 
o ochronie zabytków i opiece nad zabytkami oraz niektórych innych ustaw 
[Changes in the criminal law protection of monuments in connection with the 
enactment of the Act of 22 June 2017 amending the Act on the protection 
and care of monuments and some other acts]. Santander Culture and Art. Re-
view, 1(4), 81-96, https://doi.org/10.4467/2450050xsnr.18.004.9765
Glaser, S., & Mogilnicki, A. (1934). Kodeks karny. Komentarz.  [Criminal code. 
Commentary]. Krakow, Poland: Księgarnia Powszechna.
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Gostyński, Z. (1982). Prawo o wykroczeniach [Law on petty offences]. Katowice, 
Poland: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu śląskiego.
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ca Polska. 
Makowski, W. (1937). Kodeks karny. Komentarz [Criminal Code. Commentary]. 
Warsaw, Poland: F. Hoesik.
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administracyjnych kar pieniężnych [Some remarks on the specific nature of 
administrative fines]. In M. Błachucki (Ed.), Administracyjne kary pieniężne 
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eniężnych [Nature and legal structure of administrative fines]. Studia 
Prawnicze, 4, 123-150.
Theisen, R. D., & Vesper, C. (2010). Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht [Law on administra-
tive offenses]. Witten, Germany: Bernhardt, Horst.
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PETTY OFFENCES IN POLAND BETWEEN CRIMINAL LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Summary
The legislator may have different views on the role and position of petty offence 
law in the contemporary legal order. They are often extreme. This ranges from 
treating petty offence law as a variety of criminal law, to simply accepting that it 
is nothing more than law of order. What is more, it often happens that adopting 
a specific concept requires quite different functions and goals of petty offence 
law. For these reasons, the fate of petty offence law varies. However, this does not 
affect the essence of the relationship between petty offence law and both criminal 
and administrative law, which is relatively large. With this in mind, the authors 
488





made efforts to synthetically yet comprehensively present the essential features of 
Polish petty offence law and its evolution from the 1920-30s to the present day. 
It is worth emphasising once again that the current shape of petty offence law is 
the result of long-term changes which resulted in a number of effects, not always 
desired. Moreover, as part of the conclusions, an attempt was made to formulate 
a prognosis for the development of this branch of law and the direction in which 
it will probably go.
Keywords: petty offences, relationship between petty offence, crime and admin-
istrative tort, evolution of Polish petty offence law
SITNI PREKRŠAJI U POLJSKOJ IZMEĐU KAZNENOG I 
UPRAVNOG PRAVA
Sažetak
Zakonodavac može imati različite poglede na ulogu i položaj prava sitnih pre-
kršaja u suvremenome pravnom poretku, od onih koji pravo sitnih prekršaja 
smatraju vrstom kaznenog prava do onih koji jednostavno prihvaćaju da je ono 
tek pravo očuvanja reda. Štoviše, često se događa da prihvaćanje određenog 
koncepta zahtijeva specifično poimanje uloge i položaja prava sitnih prekršaja. 
Zbog tih je razloga sudbina prava sitnih prekršaja promjenjiva. Ipak, to sve ne 
utječe na samu bit odnosa prava sitnih prekršaja s kaznenim i upravnim pra-
vom. S tim na umu, autori rada predstavljaju bitne karakteristike poljskog prava 
sitnih prekršaja na sintetičan i sveobuhvatan način kao i njegovu evoluciju od 
20-ih godina 20. stoljeća do današnjih dana. Potrebno je još jedanput naglasiti 
da je trenutačno stanje prava sitnih prekršaja rezultat dugotrajnih promjena 
koje su proizvele mnoge učinke, ne uvijek namjeravane. Štoviše, u zaključku 
autori pokušavaju formulirati prognozu daljnjeg razvoja te grane prava i smjera 
u kojem će on vjerojatno ići.
Ključne riječi: sitni prekršaji, odnos sitnog prekršaja, kaznenog djela i uprav-
nog delikta, evolucija poljskog prava sitnih prekršaja
